Security Awareness Blog – Risk Intelligence

Date Name

DescAsc

Mental Models

One of the problems with the current approach to information security awareness is that methodologies such as ENISA are detailed about the logistics of planning security awareness but don’t have much to say about the content of security awareness.

So, how would you determine what information an audience needs to know so that they can manage the risks they face? Mental models offer a structured way of approaching risk communications rather than just “broadcasting facts”.

A mental model is a pattern of understanding held by an individual. It consists of what beliefs they hold, the strength of those beliefs and the connection between beliefs. Safety experts note that when risk communication takes place the audience will have some degree of pre-existing knowledge which forms their mental model:

“…for most risks, people have at least some relevant beliefs, which they will use in interpreting the communication. They may have heard some things about the risk in question. It may remind them of related phenomena.” (Morgan et al 2002)

Details

17th March 2011 Leave a commentBlog, Mental ModelsBy rskadmin

Bounded Rationality

Are humans rational? When we see computer users to silly things which place themselves or their information at risk its easy to take a view that people are illogical. The problem is that logic can’t be examined separately from perception.

There is significant debate within psychology literature as to the extent to which humans can be described as rational. Rationality is sometimes described as the ability for individuals to select the “best” option when confronted with a set of choices. The best option is also referred to as a “value maximising” option when the most benefit is obtained for the least expenditure of resources or exposure to risk.

The problem is that people routinely fail to select a “value maximising” option and exhibit apparently illogical behaviour. Commonly, an option mathematically modelled as the best choice by the technical experts isn’t the choice chosen by information system users when responding to risk.

Details

9th April 2011 Leave a commentBlog, Risk Psychology, Security EconomicsBy rskadmin

Information Classification

Information of different types need to be secured in different ways. Therefore a classification system is needed, whereby information is classified, a policy is laid down on how to handle information according to it’s class and security mechanisms are enforced on systems handling information accordingly.

25th May 2011 Leave a commentFeaturedBy rskadmin

Upcoming Articles / Presentations

We’re currently working on a research project to understand more about why people share passwords and how often it happens.

26th May 2011 Leave a commentBlog, ConferencesBy rskadmin

Death by a Thousand Facts: Criticising the Technocratic Approach to Information Security Awareness

Recently I co-authored a paper “Death by a Thousand Facts” with David Lacey for the HAISA conference where we explored the nature of how technical experts choose what content is included in risk communications. A copy of the proceedings is available here. Basically, mainstream information security awareness techniques are failing to evolve at the same…

Details

1st June 2011 Leave a commentBlog, Mental Models, Organisational Culture, Security EconomicsBy rskadmin

Sep42011

Organisational Culture and Compliance

Many of you will be familiar with the footage of Ian Tomlinson apparently being struck by a Metropolitan Police Officer in London on the day of the G20 protests. After the footage was aired, senior members of the Met Police were quick to promote the narrative of a “bad apple”. They pointed out that the Met Police is an organisation which includes some 50,000 people.

You have to have some sympathy for the police. They do a difficult job. The problem with the bad apple narrative is the video footage of the incident. Although the attack on Ian Tonlinson took place immediately in front of at least three other members of the Met Police, none of them appear concerned enough to go to the aid of Tomlinson. Neither are they seen to remonstrate with their colleague.

Details

4th September 2011 Leave a commentBlog, Organisational CultureBy rskadmin

Dec132011

Learned Helplessness

I’m back from the ISSA conference in Baltimore. Conferences are a great place to test out ideas to find out which ones stand up to scrutiny. I was giving my “Death by a Thousand Facts” presentation (otherwise known as the We’ve Got It All Wrong Roadshow) when Marcus Ranum pointed out a problem with my application of the term “learned helplessness”.

Learned Helplessness is a concept used to describe the effect when animals essentially “give up” and consign themselves to negative consequences. In a famous series of experiments, Martin Seligman put dogs in pens with a low wall and ran an electric current through the floor to produce an unpleasant sensation. The dogs which had not encountered the shocks before jumped over the wall to escape the sensation. Surprisingly, the dogs which had previously been exposed to shocks which they hadn’t been able to escape essentially “gave up” and lay down in the pen.

Details

13th December 2011 1 CommentBlog, Risk PsychologyBy rskadmin

Mar52012

Definition of Security Awareness

I’ve studied it for years, I’ve delivered it and I’ve even sat through it but I’m still not really sure what “it” is.

We talk about raising “security awareness” but what does that actually mean? The dictionary definitions I’ve seen commonly refer to awareness as a state of knowledge about risk. Thousands of articles and books have been written on increasing security awareness but very little time has been spent trying to define it.

The ISF Standard of Good Practice defines security awareness as “the extent to which staff understand the importance of information security, the level of security required by the organisation and their individual security responsibilities.” This seems like a reasonable definition but note that there is no behavioural component. People can (and do!) continue with unsafe behaviour despite their knowledge of the risks. Empirical evidence from outside of information security tells us that just knowing about a risk isn’t enough. Consider smokers and people who drive without using a seat belt. They’re surely all “aware” of the risks but somehow their behaviour continues.

Details

5th March 2012 Leave a commentBlog, Risk PsychologyBy rskadmin

ISSA Web Conference – You’ve Got Humans on Your Network: Securing the End User

I’m presenting for the ISSA web conference on security awareness on 22nd May.

Registrations are available here.

It’s an exciting line up and i’m really excited to see other speakers referencing mental models. One day we’ll look back on the old “data dump” approach of security awareness and wonder what got into us.

15th May 2012 Leave a commentBlog, ConferencesBy rskadmin

Jun42012

ISSA Security Awareness Column June 2012 – Security Awareness in Crisis

You wouldn’t know it by looking at it, but the information security awareness industry is in crisis. Humans are increasingly seen as the weak link in information security defences and human factors are increasing in prominence as a preferred exploit. Time after time we’re seeing expensive technical solutions bypassed by a simple call to the helpdesk or someone just asking users for their password. A cynic might say that’s because mistakes are inevitable when humans are involved. However, have we made our best attempt at managing human information security risks? In a series of columns about awareness and risk communications we’ll be taking a fresh look at the ways we attempt to manage human risks.

Technical information security solutions have advanced in leaps and bounds over the last two decades. We now have real time anti-virus, local firewalls and automated patching. It’s a far cry from the old days when we had to remember to load anti-virus manually once we started our computer. By comparison, human security management remains largely unchanged. We create information security policies and publish them on intranets. We hold mandatory training sessions. If the problem is getting worse then what is the solution? More policies? More mandatory training? Or, is there a fundamental problem in how security professionals are approaching the problem? Remind me again what the problem is we’re trying to solve? Our implicit assumption seems to be that the cause of insecure behaviour is a “lack of facts” known by an audience. Hence we distribute information in the hope the behaviour improves. But what if people have heard our message before and that didn’t fix it? Telling people again what they have likely heard before can only have a marginal return at best.

Details

4th June 2012 Leave a commentBlog, Mental ModelsBy rskadmin