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Aug162013

Where Do Security Awareness Topics Come From?

I’m amazed at how many people are offering advice on what information security topics I should be deploying. They seem to know what training is needed despite having never met me or my beautiful users and not knowing anything about my organisation or it’s goals. There are plenty of top ten lists of awareness topics. Numerous generic training packages are available on the internet. I’ve got nothing against generic awareness materials or topic lists as such. In fact some of it is very professional and far better than individual organisations could create. While it might be easy to use someone else’s training package or use their list of recommended training topics that doesn’t necessarily make it a good idea. I worry that we haven’t properly defined the problem that we’re trying to solve. If training material X is the solution, what was the problem?

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16th August 2013Leave a commentBlog, Security Awareness, Security EconomicsBy Geordie
Oct12015

What the TJ Hooper Case Means for Security Awareness

For those not familiar with the case, TJ Hooper was a landmark in tort law that established an important standard for negligence. The case was heard in 1932 to assign liability for a lost cargo. A tug towing the cargo on a barge had set to sea in good weather but later that night there…

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1st October 2015Leave a commentBlog, Security Awareness, Security EconomicsBy Geordie

The Limits of Password Security Awareness

I’ve contributed a posting on password strengths as an engineering problem rather than an an awareness problem on the SANS Securing The Human Blog. There’s a great quote from “Evil Dave” that sums up the problem rather well: “Through 20 years of effort, we’ve sucesfully trained everyone to use passwords that are hard for humans to remember, but…

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30th July 2012Leave a commentBlog, Security EconomicsBy rskadmin
Dec162013

The Importance of Executive Support

Senior management support® is something often mentioned as critical to the success of an information security awareness campaign. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, senior management help direct the usage of resources within the organization. Without their support, you won’t get much of a training budget, permission to take staff away from productive duties and you might even struggle to get a room booking. Secondly, managers set the tone for behavior in the organization and it’s common for staff to imitate their manager. This is often exhibited in the way they dress like their managers and also when they behave like their managers. Do your managers scoff that ‘the rules’ are for everyone else? That training is only for the IT-illiterate and don’t bother to show up? The bad news is that many of your staff will copy these behaviors.

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16th December 2013Leave a commentBlog, Risk Psychology, Security Awareness, Security Economics, Security MetricsBy Geordie

RSA Europe 2012 Security Awareness Debate

I’m really looking forward to RSA Europe 2012 next week where I’ll be taking part in a debate about whether or not organisations should train their staff in security awareness. It is being organised by Acumin and the RANT community. Participating with me will be: Christian Toon, European Head of Information Risk, Iron Mountain Europe Thom Langford, Director Global Security…

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4th October 2012Leave a commentBlog, Security Economics, Security MetricsBy rskadmin
Jan12014

Personas For Security Awareness

Large scale awareness programs can be challenging with so many topics to cover, so many different communication options and such varied audiences to consider. Also, your communication efforts will be competing with background noise. Every day, people are bombarded with advice. Exercise more, eat more greens and don’t click on dodgy links. The question is how you can make the most of the limited time and attention available. The Pareto Principle, also known at the 80/20 rule, proposes that 80% of consequences come from 20% of causes. If we apply this to security awareness it implies that 80% of the risk comes from 20% of topics. The problem is in knowing which 20% of users and content this applies to.

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1st January 2014Leave a commentBlog, Mental Models, Security Awareness, Security EconomicsBy Geordie
Jun62015

Moral Hazard

In our efforts to promote secure behaviour, our task is often made more difficult by the fact that often the people we need to influence are often not the same people who would suffer in the event of a security breach. Typically, the people who would suffer most in the event of a breach are…

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6th June 2015Leave a commentBlog, Risk Psychology, Security Awareness, Security EconomicsBy Geordie
Mar112013

ISSA Security Awareness Column March 2013 – Lowering Security Awareness

We spend a lot of time talking about how to raise security awareness. We fill entire books, columns and conferences with it. However, anything that can go up must also go down. How about we turn the phrase on its head and ask what lowers security awareness? Just as there are behaviours that raise security awareness there are also some that lower security awareness. But what can we do about it? Name and shame was an important step in getting software vendors to deal with security vulnerabilities in their products. We should be equally critical when human vulnerabilities are created through the promotion of unsafe attitudes and behaviours. In this column I’m going to name and shame particularly egregious examples which I think reduces security awareness.

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11th March 2013Leave a commentBlog, Risk Compensation, Risk Psychology, Security Awareness, Security EconomicsBy Geordie
Sep62012

ISSA Security Awareness Column August 2012 – Security Satisficing

What if much of our security advice to users was a waste of their time? What if some of it actually made users worse off? These are bold words but stay with me and let’s see where this goes. There will be some maths on the journey but it will be worth it I promise. Let’s look at passwords as an example. Many thousands of pages of security policy have been generated on creating strong passwords. It’s one of the most common subjects for security awareness. More letters, more numbers, make it longer and put a special character in it. Actually, most passwords don’t need to be strong, they just need to be difficult to guess which isn’t the same thing. Cormac Herley points out that password strength no longer has the critical role in security that it used to. It’s largely irrelevant since most systems now control the rate of password guessing attempts. For example only allowing five attempts every 30 minutes. In this scenario, the difference between 7 character and 8 character passwords is negligible if the system limits a brute force attack to 240 attempts per day. Modern authentication systems are much more likely to be compromised by password database disclosures, password re-use and key-loggers. Complexity does not assist with managing any of these threats. For years we’ve been focused on complexity and as a result users come up with combinations like “Password1” which meet our complexity rules but don’t effectively mitigate their risks. We need to change. We need to stop talking about password complexity and start talking about password commonality. Potentially, we’re doing more harm than good by occupying valuable (and limited) attention spans with topics of marginal return. The risks have changed and our risk communication needs to reflect that.

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6th September 2012Leave a commentBlog, Security EconomicsBy rskadmin

Death by a Thousand Facts: Criticising the Technocratic Approach to Information Security Awareness

Recently I co-authored a paper “Death by a Thousand Facts” with David Lacey for the HAISA conference where we explored the nature of how technical experts choose what content is included in risk communications. A copy of the proceedings is available here. Basically, mainstream information security awareness techniques are failing to evolve at the same…

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1st June 2011Leave a commentBlog, Mental Models, Organisational Culture, Security EconomicsBy rskadmin
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