Martin Luther King said ‘I have a dream’, not ‘I have a plan’
– Simon Sinek
Engaging end users using marketing, psychology and safety theory.
About Geordie Stewart
His award winning masters thesis at the Royal Holloway Information Security Group examined information security awareness from a fresh perspective as a marketing and communications challenge. In his regular speaking appearances at international information security conferences such as RSA, ISACA and ISSA he challenges conventional thinking on risk culture and communication.
In addition to senior security management roles in large UK organisations Geordie writes the security awareness column for the ISSA international journal.
How frustrating is it when you point out the risks to people and they just don’t listen? Every day around the world there are millions of people who smoke, drive too fast and click on strange emails, even though they’ve been repeatedly told about the dangers. They are ‘risk aware’ in the technical sense of the word and yet their behaviour continues. This is a big problem since the mainstream approach to security awareness assumes that all that’s needed to achieve behavioural change is an understanding of the risks. Traditionally when encountering non-compliant behaviour, we security technocrats reiterate the facts and increase the threat of sanctions. But, there is another way.
Luckily for us this is a problem that safety risk communicators have been grappling with for decades. The safety risk communications field has a number of explanatory frameworks to predict how people will react to risk communications. One of the most interesting models to arise is the Extended Parallel Processing Model (EPPM) which seeks to explain why people fail to take action once aware of a threat. This is a goldmine for security professionals looking to apply a more structured, formal approach for promoting behavioural change.
I’m really looking forward to RSA Europe 2012 next week where I’ll be taking part in a debate about whether or not organisations should train their staff in security awareness. It is being organised by Acumin and the RANT community. Participating with me will be: Christian Toon, European Head of Information Risk, Iron Mountain Europe Thom Langford, Director Global Security…Details
Any endeavour is made doubly difficult when pursued with a lack of metrics and without a clear understanding of cause and effect. When stumbling in the dark, facts are the flashlight of comprehension, illuminating the way forward when the path is unclear. Information security is often required to function in the dark with little in the way of facts to guide us. We hear noises and bump into things but can never be certain if we’re going in the right direction.
When security fails, how do we know? While failures of integrity and availability are obvious, failures of confidentiality can be silent and insidious. Some actors such as LulzSec boast about their exploits and derive their benefits from the resulting publicity. Other actors quietly go about their ‘business’ and organisations may not realise they’ve been breached. Often, even when we do discover failures of confidentiality the organisational interest is to bury it. As a result, our profession is rich in rumours but poor in facts which make it difficult when trying to understand the effectiveness of security controls.Details
During the course of World War Two in the Pacific there were numerous primitive cultures on remote islands that came into contact with Westerners for the first time. Islanders were particularly impressed with the cargo that the visitors brought with them. At the conclusion of World War Two most of the visitors left and the cargo stopped arriving. Across multiple islands separated by thousands of miles a strange phenomenon occurred. Primitive cultures attempted to invite new cargo by imitating the conditions of what was happening when the cargo was arriving. They cleared spaces for aircraft landing strips and “controllers” dressed up with vines for wires and sticks for microphones. Bizarre ritualised behaviour developed around the use of artefacts like uniforms and insignias. “Cargo Cult” behaviour was a phrase coined by the scientist Richard Feynman to explain activity that occurs where appearances are superficially imitated. A result is pursued without actually understanding the underlying mechanisms of cause and effect. Pre-requisites are mistaken for causation. The pattern across so many independent island cultures suggests that this confusion is part of human nature. A good causation parody you may have heard of is a lack of pirates causes global warming.Details
What if much of our security advice to users was a waste of their time? What if some of it actually made users worse off? These are bold words but stay with me and let’s see where this goes. There will be some maths on the journey but it will be worth it I promise. Let’s look at passwords as an example. Many thousands of pages of security policy have been generated on creating strong passwords. It’s one of the most common subjects for security awareness. More letters, more numbers, make it longer and put a special character in it. Actually, most passwords don’t need to be strong, they just need to be difficult to guess which isn’t the same thing. Cormac Herley points out that password strength no longer has the critical role in security that it used to. It’s largely irrelevant since most systems now control the rate of password guessing attempts. For example only allowing five attempts every 30 minutes. In this scenario, the difference between 7 character and 8 character passwords is negligible if the system limits a brute force attack to 240 attempts per day. Modern authentication systems are much more likely to be compromised by password database disclosures, password re-use and key-loggers. Complexity does not assist with managing any of these threats. For years we’ve been focused on complexity and as a result users come up with combinations like “Password1” which meet our complexity rules but don’t effectively mitigate their risks. We need to change. We need to stop talking about password complexity and start talking about password commonality. Potentially, we’re doing more harm than good by occupying valuable (and limited) attention spans with topics of marginal return. The risks have changed and our risk communication needs to reflect that.Details
I’ve contributed a posting on password strengths as an engineering problem rather than an an awareness problem on the SANS Securing The Human Blog. There’s a great quote from “Evil Dave” that sums up the problem rather well: “Through 20 years of effort, we’ve sucesfully trained everyone to use passwords that are hard for humans to remember, but…Details